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Quantum resources such as superposition and entanglement have been used to provide uncondi-
tional key distribution, secret sharing and communication complexity reduction. In this letter we
present a novel quantum information protocol for dining cryptographers problem and anonymous
vote casting by a group of voters. We successfully demonstrate the experimental realization of the
protocol using single photon transmission. Our implementation employs a flying particle scheme
where a photon passes by the voters who perform a sequence of actions (unitary transformations)
on the photonic state at their local stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most important features of quantum me-
chanics involve a system’s ability to be in a superpo-
sition of two classically distinguishable states and the
impossibility to perfectly distinguish between two non-
orthogonal states. These features correspondingly lead
to quantum information processing schemes and proto-
cols, such as quantum cryptographic key distribution [1],
quantum Byzantine agreement [2] and quantum commu-
nication complexity reduction [3]. Interestingly, these
problems have found their solutions not only with the
help of entangled states, commonly seen as a basic and
main resource in quantum information processing, but
also with sequential protocols where a single quantum
system is transferred from one partner to the other. Each
partner then performs an action that cumulates with oth-
ers so that a final decision is reached.
In this report, we present and experimentally demon-
strate a novel quantum solution to a problem of dining
cryptographers [4]. It was introduced by Chaum and
refers to three cryptographers who went out together for
a dinner in a high-class restaurant. In the end, they
learned that the cheque was paid anonymously, either by
one of them or by the agency they work for. The cryptog-
raphers respected each others right for secret generosity,
but wanted to know if the dinner was covered by the
agency. This problem is also known as the unanimous
voting problem.
A simple, classical solution was proposed in the original
paper and can be outlined as follows: The diners pair-
wise establish secret bits, kij = 0, 1, and each of them
announces sum (modulo 2) of his secret bits if he did not
pay or the negation of this sum if he did. Now calculat-
ing XOR of the announced sum reveals the outcome of
the problem where a result 1 shows that one of them has
paid, while 0 suggests that it was at the expense of the
∗Electronic address: boure@fysik.su.se
agency.
However for a generalized case, this solution poses a
number of problems and drawbacks. First is a collision,
which occurs when two (or any even number) of partners
have paid as their alterations would cancel each other
and the agency incorrectly turns out to be the sponsor.
The second is complexity, which is a complication for a
large group of users. Finally, the last partner to reveal
his outcome might forge the broadcast.
Note that without the collision issue, the problem of
dining cryptographers is equivalent to the problem of
unanimous veto voting where casting a veto is the ad-
mission of payment by a party. Typically, unanimous
vetoing conforms to an organizational situation when a
certain decision should be made by a group of people
unanimously but the people want to keep their individ-
ual decisions a secret.
A classical solution is presented in Ref. [5]. In the pro-
tocol, the partners must agree on a Schnorr group and
demonstrate their knowledge of the discrete logarithms in
each run without revealing them. Using two broadcast
rounds and the assumption that the broadcast channel
available to each voter is reliable, the protocol preserves
the sender’s anonymity with acceptable security unless
all the participants are compromised. However, as is the
case with most classical solutions, this protocol relies on
the difficulty in reversing of some calculations, which is
an arbitrary assumption in the light of the growing avail-
able computational power.
In regards to the classical limitations, quantum solu-
tions have also been proposed where the protocol secu-
rity does not depend on the assumptions about compu-
tational complexity. It was observed by Hillery, Ziman,
Buzˇek, and Bielinkova´ [6] that correlations of multipar-
tite, high-dimensional GHZ states can be used for the
quantum solution. This was later rediscovered indepen-
dently in [7] where the protocol security relies on the
GHZ paradox and the genuineness of the shared GHZ
states between the involved parties. For a three party
protocol, upon satisfying this condition, each party per-
forms a local unitary operation on the shared GHZ state
in the case of a payment. Randomly selected copies of
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2the shared states are then used to distinguish between
the cases when an even and odd number of payments
are made. Once this is accomplished, the distinction be-
tween zero and double payment scenarios (for the even
case) and a single against triple payment (for the odd
case) is the final step in the realization of the protocol.
This is possible as the GHZ states are highly symmetri-
cal, e.g., under permutations of parties, so certain actions
by one user can be compensated by others. The general-
ized protocol promises unconditional security along with
the guarantee of no multiple payment scenarios.
Despite the complete security of the protocol, for N
voters, the protocol would require (N + 1)N -dimensional
Hilbert space. Generating entangled states of many par-
ticles, even a simpler one as GHZ, is a non-trivial task
and suffers from low generation rate and low state fi-
delity. Fortunately, the essential correlations of the GHZ
states can be effectively simulated by phase shifts per-
formed sequentially by all users on a single particle, fol-
lowed by a measurement carried out by a receiver. This
greatly reduces the complexity of the experiment, which
now utilizes a single quantum system.
II. QUANTUM PROTOCOL
Let us start with a simplified version of our protocol,
which is sensitive to collisions. The protocol’s feature is
that it is based on a single qubit and is later generalized
to a scheme without collisions.
The protocol is based on the concept of mutually un-
biased bases (MUBs). For a d dimensional system, con-
sider states {{| j, l 〉}j}d−1l=0 , where j enumerates the basis
and l–the vector in the basis. j = d shall always de-
note the computational basis and the number of other
known bases depends on the dimension d. For powers
of primes, sets of MUBs are informationally complete
(j = 0, 1, ..., d) [8]. In particular, for prime d ≥ 2 we
have
| d, l 〉 = | k 〉 (computational basis),
∀j<d | j, l 〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
k=0 ω
kl+jk2 | k 〉.
ω = e
2pii
d (1)
From Eq. (1) we can observe that there are two impor-
tant unitary transformations,
Vd = Diag(1, ω, ω
2, ω3, ...) (2)
cyclically permutes the vectors within any of the non-
computational bases, while
Ud = Diag(1, ω, ω
4, ω9, ...) (3)
cyclically changes the basis (neither of these operations
affects the computational basis). Since the first operation
transforms any state with j 6= d to an orthogonal one,
it will be used for casting a veto. Ud on the other hand,
transforms a state to a completely unbiased one, so it will
be used by all participants of the protocol to improve the
voter’s privacy.
d = 2 is a special case, where standard formulae (1)
for MUBs fail, and we have
V2 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
U2 =
(
1 0
0 i
)
. (4)
Note that U22 = V2 so the U2 not only changes the bases,
but also the cycles through the states The basic version
of the protocol for N voters will involve N + 2 parties:
a sender (S), N voters and a receiver (R). S has a state
preparation source, R has a measurement device and the
voters are provided with sets of phase shifters. This is a
flying particle protocol where voters do not perform any
measurement but rather execute local unitary transfor-
mations on a particle propagating among them (as shown
in the Fig. 1 for three participants). Such schemes have
found applications in experimental realizations of quan-
tum secret sharing [9], communication complexity reduc-
tion [10] and Byzantine agreement [11].
FIG. 1: A schematic representation of the (N + 2)-party pro-
tocol where N = 3. S prepares a random state, which is then
propagated through N voters that perform a unitary transfor-
mation (UxlV yl ; xl, yl ∈ {0, 1}). Upon arrival of a particle,
the receiver performs a measurement in a randomly chosen
basis.
First consider a protocol for an arbitrary number of
voters N > 2 sequentially communicating a single qubit.
We begin with establishing an infrastructure to protect
the voter’s privacy. The voters will privately decide about
the power of U2 applied by them, so that an auxiliary
eavesdropper will not know in which basis she should
measure the state, regardless of the place of its inter-
ception. However, to make it possible for R and S to
conclude the voting result, the overall transformation
of this kind should be null. This is done as follows:
each voter sets his or her device to perform Uxl2 , where
0 ≤ xl ≤ 3 is a secret random integer, and l labels the
voter. S sends in a random state from one of the MUBs{
{| 0, 0 〉, | 0, 1 〉} = 1√
2
(| 0 〉+ | 1 〉), 1√
2
(| 0 〉 − | 1 〉)
}
,{
{| 1, 0 〉, | 1, 1 〉} = 1√
2
(| 0 〉+ i| 1 〉), 1√
2
(| 0 〉 − i| 1 〉)
}
and
R measures in one, randomly chosen, of these bases.
They then discuss their choices and if they have a strong
3match, they accept the choice of the secret numbers,
otherwise the voters choose them again. If
∑N
l=1 xl =
0 mod 4, the overall effect of U2s is the unity. On the
other hand, it is unknown, to which the distributed state
belongs.
For the voting step, the sender prepares | 0, 0 〉 or | 1, 0 〉,
chosen at random. Each voter chooses Uxl2 V2 if he wants
to veto or Uxl2 otherwise. The receiver measures in one
of the bases with j = 0 or 1. If S has sent | j, 0 〉 and R
registers | j, 1 〉 he can be sure that some voter has put
a veto. However, registering | j, 0 〉 might mean any even
number of vetoes, including 0. This protocol is subject to
collisions and works under the assumption that at most
one voter poses a veto.
What are the ingredients of the protocol with arbitrar-
ily many vetoes? First, there should be no collisions, so
the decision should always be conclusive. The easiest way
to guarantee the conclusiveness to N parties is to count
the votes modulo N ′ > N . The other aspect is that we
may prefer not to reveal how many vetoes were posed;
the only information to be known is if there were any.
In general, N ′ can be taken as p, a prime larger than
N . That way, we are certain, that there exist bases,
between which the voters may switch, and within which
they can change states avoiding collisions, even if all of
them cast a veto. The voters can realize Vp and U
xl
p
as given by Eqns. (2) and (3). In the first step, the
voters will again randomly choose their secret numbers
xl from {0, ...., p − 1}. The sender will randomly choose
state from Eqns. (1) and the receiver the basis in which
he would measure. They proceed until they verify that∑p
l=1 xl = 0 mod p. Then, in the second step, the voters
together with Uxlp apply an additional V transformation
if they want to pose a veto. S sends | 0, 0 〉 or | 1, 0 〉 from
Eq. (1). If R registers the same state as sent by S, it is
likely that no one vetoed.
As an example, for the case of three participants where
the protocol can be run using a system with d = 4, lets
consider the two following bases (with vectors given by
columns) [12]:
B1 =
1
2
 1 1 1 11 i −1 −i1 −1 1 −1
1 −i −1 i
 ,
B2 =
1
2
 1 1 1 −11 i −1 i1 −1 1 1
−1 i 1 i
 . (5)
U = Diag(1, 1, 1,−1) plays a role of Ud and V =
Diag(1, i,−1,−i) will serve to cast a veto. Note that we
only use two bases, so the private numbers used by the
voters to protect their privacy are simply bits. Neverthe-
less it does not compromise the security of the protocol,
since B1 and B2 are complementary.
One can straight-forwardly generalize these operators
for squares of primes d = p2 and even other power. Vd
is represented by Diag(1, ω, ω2, ...) and Ud is an entan-
gling operation-for pair of subsystem it will transform an
equimodular product state into a maximally entangled
one, for more constituents-to a GHZ state. for example
for d = 9, U = Diag(1, 1, 1, 1, ω3, ω6, 1, ω6, ω3). Starting
with a state |0, 0〉 = 1√
d
(1, 1, ..., 1), they lead to d MUBs.
One potential loophole still refers to collisions. Since a
veto is anonymous, the only reason a voter to be willing
to cheat is to cancel out all possible vetoes. To do this, he
would need to know how many other voters (say, t) would
pose a veto and apply V −t. This can be deterministically
successful only if the dishonest voter knows the intentions
of the honest ones. Otherwise, he can apply a random
power V hoping to cancel out all other vetoes. A simple
way to eliminate this possibility is to impose a hardware
limitation allowing the voters to pose only a single veto.
The other issue is honesty of S and R. One option is
to integrate the role of S and R with the first and the
last voter, respectively, and then repeat the procedure
for various orders of voters.
Alternatively, for each run of the experiment one
can allow each voter to have random and private trit
yl,m = 0, 1, 2 (m labels the run of the experiment. Upon
yl,m = 1, the voters perform U
xl according to their cho-
sen numbers xl in attempt to establish infrastructure.
For yl,m = 2 they also cast the veto if they wish to do
so, and finally for yl,m = 0 they do nothing. S sends any
state involved in the protocol and R measures in the ran-
dom basis. Only those runs, where the voter had all their
trits equal matter. First, a list of runs with yl,m = 0. If
for those runs there is a perfect correlation between states
sent and received, R and S can be trusted, otherwise the
protocol is aborted. Then a list of runs with all yl,m = 1
is used to verify if the infrastructure was established. If
this is the case, the voters find a run with all yl,m = 2 to
confirm if a veto was cast.
III. ROADMAP FOR THE PROTOCOL
A. R and S are trusted, three voters
1. Setup stage: S sends a four-level quantum sys-
tem prepared in a random state from sets B1 and
B2, given in (5), where the computational basis
is given by {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |3〉}. The voters, A,B,C,
choose if they would apply a unitary operation
U = Diag(1, 1, 1,−1) or not. R, in turn, randomly
chooses to perform a measurement in basis B1 or
B2. Afterwards, S firstly communicates the basis
that was used to prepare the state and if it does
not match the basis choice of R, the round is dis-
carded. Secondly, S communicates which state was
produced in this run of the experiment. If R finds
a match between the produced and the measured
state, this validates the voters choice of even num-
ber of U . However, if there are no such correlations,
the round is repeated and voters have to make their
4choice for U again.
2. Voting stage: S sends the following two ququart
states
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉+ |3〉) (6a)
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉 − |3〉) (6b)
in a random order (each state is sent exactly once).
Each voter receives the particle and applies U if he
decided so in the previous step. If he wants to pose
a veto, he also applies V = Diag(1, i,−1,−i)}. R
randomly chooses one of the two bases to measure
for both runs.
3. Outcome stage: Since S changes the initial state
in each run and R measures in the same basis for
both runs, they will have a match in their choices
for one of the two runs. Only after they reveal their
actions, it will be known that which of the two runs
is relevant. In this run, if the state detected by R
matches the one sent by S, it is certain that no veto
was cast and the parties unanimously agree that
the agency has paid. If however, R detects another
state from the same basis, to what was prepared
by S, it is certain that a veto was made and the
state measured by R gives information about the
number of vetoes.
B. R and S are not trusted by the observers
We shall also consider the case in which S and R are
likely to conspire to produce false outcomes. For exam-
ple, R can give fictional outcomes to convince everybody
that a veto was cast, or S can alter the input state to
ensure that a correlation is not observed. The easy so-
lution is to allow observers to randomly perform a null
transformation.
1. Each voter decides if he applies U and, of course,
if he wants to pose a veto by applying V .
2. Each voter produces a random trit. Its values will
correspond to the following actions. When 0 is
drawn, they perform no action on the particle. This
is to test the honesty of R and S. When 1 is drawn,
they perform U (if they planned so), but not V ,
which allows them to test if they have chosen the
number of U to be even. For 2 they perform all op-
erations they intended, which is the voting round.
3. S prepares randomly one of eight states from set
(5), and R measures in B1 or B2. Then they both
share the list of state they have sent/received with
the voters. Up to this stage, the choices of the
observes and their random trits are kept secret.
4. The observers reject all the runs of the experiment,
where R chose to measure in the wrong basis. This
is similar to the sifting procedure in cryptography.
5. Afterwards, the voters announce their random trits,
but not if they applied U or V . They reject all the
runs where the trits were not equal. From the re-
maining rounds, the rounds with three zeros imply
that the parties performed no operations on the
state sent by S. If R measured the same state as
well then they (S and R) are honest and dishon-
est otherwise. For the runs with three ones, if the
results of S and R do not match then the voters
choice of U , that must be even, was wrong and the
protocol has to be redone. Finally, for the runs
with three twos, they performed all the intended
operations (1l, U, V, UV).
6. If R measures a given state, he is unable to in-
fer the number of vetoes from that state without
knowing the state that was prepared by S. Simi-
larly, If S chooses randomly between B1 and B2
bases, this leaves no scope for the voters to cheat.
Thus, the honesty of all the involved parties can
be established in this way. Additionally, now con-
sidering that their honesty is proven, if the state
detected by R matches the one sent by S, it can
be said with certainty that no veto was cast and
the parties unanimously agree that the agency has
paid. If however, R detected another state from the
same basis, to what was prepared by S, a veto was
made and the state measured by R gives informa-
tion about the number of vetoes.‘
IV. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION
The experimental implementation of the quantum so-
lution for the N + 2 party flying particle protocol is pre-
sented in Fig. 2.
Sender S prepares a four level quantum system us-
ing 2-path and 2-polarisation encoding scheme for a sin-
gle photon attained through a heralded single photon
source. The heralded source utilizes a spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion (SPDC) process where a non-
linear crystal (BBO) is strongly pumped by a femtosec-
ond pulsed laser operating at 390 nm. The SPDC pro-
cess results in the creation of a pair of twin photons,
commonly known as the signal and idler photons. The
idler photon is then used as a trigger as its subsequent
detection by a single photon detector heralds the arrival
of the signal photon. These signal photons with well-
defined spectral and spatial characteristics are then used
as single photons for our experiment.
For a 4-dimensional physical system, information can
be encoded in the following four basis states: |H, 1〉,
|V, 1〉, |H, 2〉 and |V, 2〉. (H) and (V ) are the horizon-
tal and vertical polarizations whereas (1) and (2) are the
5two spatial modes of a single photon. In this way, we can
write a ququart state as a|H, 1〉+b|V, 1〉+c|H, 2〉+d|V, 2〉.
The single photons are initially prepared in |H 〉 us-
ing a polarizer oriented to horizontal polarization di-
rection. S can prepare any state from the B1 and
B2 bases using a 50/50 non-polarising beam splitter
(BS) followed by suitably oriented half (HWP) and
quarter-wave plates (QWP) alongwith a phase shift
setting (PP). 1√
2
(
(cos(2α)|H, 1〉 + eiφ1 sin(2α)|V, 1〉) +
eiΦ(cos(2β)|H, 2〉+ eiφ2 sin(2β)|V, 2〉)). For the basis Bi,
i = {1, 2}, the states in (5) are denoted such that Si,j
is the state defined by the column j = {1, 2, 3, 4}. For a
proof of principle experiment, we have chosen to prepare
the following states, as an example, S1,1 = (1, 1, 1, 1)
T
and S2,1 = (1, 1, 1,−1)T for the infrastructure estab-
lishment round and states S1,1 = (1, 1, 1, 1)
T , S1,3 =
(1,−1, 1,−1)T for the voting round. These four states
are parametrized as
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(
cos(2α)|H, 1〉 ± sin(2α)|V, 1〉
+eiΦ(cos(2β)|H, 2〉 ± sin(2β)|V, 2〉)). (7)
and only a HWP (α = β = ±22.5◦) in each port of the
BS (50:50) is sufficient for this purpose.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2. For
the purpose of interference stability and practicality, a
Sagnac interferometer with shifted paths is implemented
that allows us to manipulate each path individually.
FIG. 2: Experimental setup. Sender S prepares states
S1,1, S1,3, S2,1 through suitable orientations of α and β sta-
tioned in the two output ports (1), (2) of the BS. The three
voters implement their desired transformations through suit-
able tilting of HWPs in path (1) and (2) and a phase shift set-
ting PP in path (2) by mounting them on rotational stages.
A HWP just before the BS in path (2) allows the receiver
to choose the measurement basis. To implement the mea-
surement, the two paths combine at the BS followed by two
measurement stations M1 and M2.
In order to perform unitary transformations U , V and
UV ; Alice, Bob and Charlie are each provided with
two HWP oriented at 0◦ in path (1) and (2), to set
the phase θ1 and θ2 between the horizontal and the
vertical polarizations in each path respectively. PP
in path (2) sets the required phase φ2 between the
paths (1) and (2). These three plates are mounted
on rotational stages allowing the user to perform any
of the desired transformation by precisely tilting them
to the suitable position. The setting for (θi1, θ
i
2, φ
i
2),
where i = (A(Alice), B(Bob), C(Charlie)), are (0, pi, 0),
(pi/2, pi/2, pi), and (pi/2,−pi/2, pi) to perform U , V and
UV respectively. A second PP is added in path (1) for
compensation. The physical system flies through the par-
ties before arriving at the Receiver, where it is subjected
to a measurement in either of B1 or B2 bases. In addi-
tion, any unwanted phase arising from a component in
the interferometer was carefully compensated.
The measurement part consists of a HWP in path (2)
just before the BS, where the two paths recombine, fol-
lowed by measurement stations M1 and M2 at the two
output ports of the BS. The choice of the measurement
basis is set by appropriately tilting the HWP to set the
desired phase θBi (i = {1, 2}) between the polarizations
in this path, similar to the voting process. For this pur-
pose, the HWP is also mounted on a rotational stage and
another HWP is used in path (1) for compensation. M1
contains a HWP (22.5◦) succeeded by a polarising beam
splitter (PBS). The photons arriving at each output port
of the PBS are detected by multimode fiber coupled sin-
gle photon detectors. M2 is similar to M1 but contains
an additional QWP (0◦) in the beginning. This enables
the photon to be projected onto any state of the chosen
measurement basis represented by single photon detec-
tors Di(i = 1, 2, 3, 4). In our scheme, the detectors D1,
D2, D3 and D4 correspond to states S1,1, S1,3, S1,4 and
S1,2 when B1 is chosen and to states S2,1, S2,3 S2,4 and
S2,2 for the basis B2.
The detectors used are Silicon avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) from Excelitas Technologies with an effective
detection efficiency ηd = 0.55, dark count rate Rd '
400/sec and a dead time of 50 ns. An FPGA based tim-
ing system is used to record the number of coincidence
events between the signal and idler photons with a detec-
tion time window of 1.7 ns. The respective probabilities
are then estimated from the number of detection events
at each detector. For each measurement setting, approx-
imately 60, 000 photons were detected per second with a
total measurement time of 10 s.
For the infrastructure establishment round, S prepares
randomly one state from each basis (S1,1 and S2,1). Alice,
Bob and Charlie choose if they want to apply a Uxl op-
eration or not. Bearing in mind
∑N
l=1 xl = 0 mod 2, the
results of the corresponding measurements are presented
in Table I. For the voting round, S randomly prepares
one of the states (S1,1 and S1,3) from the basis B1. If
the voters choose to pose a veto, they apply UxlV with
xl ∈ {0, 1}. The results of the corresponding measure-
ments are presented in Table II. Table III shows that
6when the receiver chooses the wrong measurement basis,
the measurement result is inconclusive as all the detec-
tors click with equal probabilities.
The experimental results for each measurement set-
ting in either round are in good agreement with the ex-
pected predictions. Moreover, the interferometric visibil-
ity of our setup in all measurements is above 89%. This
leads to more than 93% success probability in each run of
the protocol (see Table II). The estimated errors include
Poissonian counting statistics and systematic errors. The
intrinsic imperfections of the BSs, PBSs and HWPs are
the main sources of systematic errors in this experiment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of dining cryptographers is a known prob-
lem in quantum communication where proposed classical
solutions are not only limited but also complex in ap-
plication. We have theoretically introduced and experi-
mentally demonstrated a novel quantum solution to this
problem using a one-way sequential protocol. The solu-
tion also extends to the anonymous veto problem and is
simple yet highly efficient based on the distribution of the
same photon among the involved parties. The obtained
experimental results validate the legitimacy of the pro-
tocol while maintaining the anonymity of the involved
participants. We believe that the simplicity and com-
pleteness of the protocol makes it very attractive from a
quantum cryptographic perspective.
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S1,1 1l 1l 1l B2 0.269± 0.022 0.241± 0.022 0.243± 0.022 0.247± 0.022
S1,1 I U U B2 0.240± 0.022 0.243± 0.022 0.251± 0.022 0.266± 0.022
S2,1 1l 1l 1l B1 0.257± 0.022 0.245± 0.022 0.226± 0.022 0.272± 0.022
S2,1 I U U B1 0.251± 0.022 0.243± 0.022 0.242± 0.022 0.265± 0.022
S2,1 1l 1l 1l B2 0.952± 0.015 0.004± 0.007 0.022± 0.007 0.022± 0.007
S2,1 1l 1l U B2 0.251± 0.022 0.235± 0.022 0.256± 0.022 0.258± 0.022
S2,1 I U U B2 0.983± 0.015 0.004± 0.007 0.002± 0.007 0.011± 0.007
S2,1 U U U B2 0.240± 0.022 0.261± 0.022 0.246± 0.022 0.253± 0.022
TABLE I: Infrastructure Establishment Round. The detectors D1, D2, D3 and D4 correspond to the states S1,1, S1,3, S1,4
and S1,2 when B1 is chosen and to states S2,1, S2,3 S2,4 and S2,2 for the basis B2. Here, the first index indicates the basis and
the second indicates the corresponding state. S prepares randomly S1,1 between S2,1 while B measures randomly in B1 or B2.
The estimated success probabilities from detection events in each detector are also shown.
8Sender Alice Bob Charlie D1 D2 D3 D4
S1,1 1l 1l 1l 0.966± 0.015 0.006± 0.007 0.010± 0.007 0.018± 0.007
S1,1 1l 1l V 0.016± 0.007 0.015± 0.007 0.008± 0.007 0.962± 0.015
S1,1 1l V V 0.011± 0.007 0.961± 0.015 0.011± 0.007 0.017± 0.007
S1,1 V V V 0.011± 0.007 0.012± 0.007 0.974± 0.015 0.001± 0.007
S1,1 1l U U 0.975± 0.015 0.006± 0.007 0.006± 0.007 0.013± 0.007
S1,1 V U U 0.023± 0.007 0.028± 0.007 0.006± 0.007 0.943± 0.015
S1,1 1l U UV 0.032± 0.007 0.026± 0.007 0.004± 0.007 0.938± 0.015
S1,1 V U UV 0.014± 0.007 0.94± 0.015 0.023± 0.007 0.024± 0.007
S1,1 1l UV UV 0.004± 0.007 0.961± 0.015 0.015± 0.007 0.020± 0.007
S1,1 V UV UV 0.014± 0.007 0.023± 0.007 0.956± 0.015 0.007± 0.007
Sender Alice Bob Charlie D1 D2 D3 D4
S1,3 1l 1l 1l 0.003± 0.007 0.966± 0.015 0.015± 0.007 0.017± 0.007
S1,3 1l 1l V 0.024± 0.007 0.030± 0.007 0.941± 0.015 0.006± 0.007
S1,3 1l V V 0.955± 0.015 0.004± 0.007 0.022± 0.007 0.019± 0.007
S1,3 V V V 0.020± 0.007 0.019± 0.007 0.015± 0.007 0.960± 0.015
S1,3 1l U U 0.002± 0.007 0.960± 0.015 0.022± 0.007 0.016± 0.007
S1,3 V U U 0.018± 0.007 0.028± 0.007 0.946± 0.015 0.008± 0.007
S1,3 1l U UV 0.018± 0.007 0.024± 0.007 0.953± 0.015 0.006± 0.007
S1,3 V U UV 0.935± 0.015 0.012± 0.007 0.026± 0.007 0.028± 0.007
S1,3 1l UV UV 0.954± 0.015 0.006± 0.007 0.022± 0.007 0.018± 0.007
S1,3 V UV UV 0.015± 0.007 0.018± 0.007 0.004± 0.007 0.963± 0.015
TABLE II: Voting Round. S prepares states S1,1 or S1,3. The voters choose to perform a veto if they decided in the last round
while R measures in B1 basis. Measurements with U
xlV yl with xl, yl ∈ {0, 1} are shown. The estimated success probabilities
from the detection events in each detector are shown for every run.
Sender Alice Bob Charlie Receiver D1 D2 D3 D4
S1,1 1l 1l 1l B2 0.257± 0.022 0.255± 0.022 0.247± 0.022 0.241± 0.022
S1,1 1l V V B2 0.249± 0.022 0.249± 0.022 0.249± 0.022 0.253± 0.022
S2,1 1l 1l 1l B1 0.252± 0.022 0.239± 0.022 0.272± 0.022 0.237± 0.022
S2,1 1l 1l V B1 0.258± 0.022 0.256± 0.022 0.254± 0.022 0.232± 0.022
S2,1 1l V V B1 0.256± 0.022 0.262± 0.022 0.241± 0.022 0.242± 0.022
S2,1 V V V B1 0.251± 0.022 0.254± 0.022 0.252± 0.022 0.244± 0.022
TABLE III: Voting Round. S prepares states S1,1 or S2,1. The voters choose to perform a veto if they decided in the last round
while R measures in either of the bases B1 or B2. Every time R chooses the wrong measurement basis, all detectors click with
equal probabilities.
